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Prior to the recent holding in Ruffenach v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 431 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026), the procedure surrounding fee hearings was considered well-settled. Since the early 1960s, Florida courts have enforced a two-part requirement for awarding attorneys’ fees:
However, the court in Ruffenach disrupted this system. Specifically, the court held that trial courts do not always need to hold evidentiary hearings or hear expert testimony to award attorneys’ fees. Not only does this case depart from more than 60 years of precedent, but it also conflicts with every other district court in Florida, making it ripe for review by the Florida Supreme Court.
The court in Ruffenach concluded that there was never any basis in statute or rule to impose the requirements. Instead, the rule was “judicially created” – meaning it was invented by judges rather than enacted by the legislature – via the holding in Lyle v. Lyle, 167 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964). In fact, the court in Ruffenach pointed out that Lyle “cited no legal authority,” and instead merely relied on “the principle that the value of personal services is proven by expert witnesses,” without stating where that principle came from. Furthermore, the court in Lyle stated – again, without citing authority – that “the self-serving nature of the testimony given by the attorney who performs the services precludes the court from making an award based solely on [the attorney’s] testimony.”
Stated differently, the court in Lyle held that because an attorney’s work is a “personal service,” and because the claiming party is seeking payment for his own attorney’s fees, a neutral expert is required to testify as to the scope of work and reasonableness of time spent on the work.
However, the Ruffenach Court pushed back. Ruffenach agreed with statements made by the concurring opinion in Island Hoppers, Ltd. v. Keith, 820 So. 2d 967, 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), that “a judge has heard enough testimony to qualify as an expert on the reasonable value of legal fees in his or her community.” Additionally, Ruffenach agreed with the 4th District Court’s assertion that a “fee expert is usually little more than a friend of the lawyer seeking fees willing to vouch for his or her friend’s fees.”
The court in Ruffenach also supported the 4th District Court’s position that “evidence that is otherwise admissible is not prohibited because it is ‘self-serving.’ Rather, the trier of fact simply takes into consideration the self-serving nature of the testimony in determining the weight that it should be given.”
Essentially, the court in Ruffenach believes that a judge can handle evaluating the reasonableness of the attorney fees sought without the need for an outside expert, especially since the experts themselves pose a risk of being biased.
The outlier holding in Ruffenach shakes up over 60 years of precedent regarding retaining fee experts. If it chooses to weigh in, the Florida Supreme Court will either correct this discrepancy or enforce this sea change throughout the state.
For any further questions, please contact Keegan Lathan.