Collapse Coverage in First-Party Property Cases

May 15, 2026

What is considered a covered “collapse” under a homeowner’s policy? One Florida appeals court recently addressed this question in Escobar v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., No. 3D24-1234, 2026 WL 817362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2026).

Specifically, the Third District Court of Appeal held that: (1) drywall is not “part of a building” within the meaning of the policy’s collapse provision; and (2) even if drywall was considered “part of a building,” the bathroom could be occupied for its intended purpose.   

In Escobar, the homeowners sought coverage for a loss that occurred when a piece of drywall fell from the bathroom ceiling during Tropical Storm Alberto. Specifically, the homeowners alleged that they were “unable to use a portion of their home for its intended purpose” because of the collapse, which mirrors the language within the policy’s “abrupt collapse” provision.

Based on the policy’s “abrupt collapse” provision, there must be: (1) an “abrupt falling down or caving in of a building or any part of a building,” and (2) because of the “abrupt falling down or caving in,” “the building or part of the building cannot be occupied for its intended purpose.” 

The parties agreed that the ceiling abruptly fell or caved in. Therefore, the court analyzed whether the drywall was considered “part of the building” according to the policy.    

When substituting the word “drywall” for “part of a building,” the court held that there would be no coverage. Specifically, the policy language would read like this: “Collapse means an abrupt falling down or caving in of … [drywall] with the result that the … [drywall] cannot be occupied for its intended purpose.”  The court pointed out that drywall cannot be occupied. A house or a bathroom in the house can be occupied, but drywall cannot.

Furthermore, the undisputed facts in the record did not demonstrate that the homeowners were unable to use the bathroom for its intended purpose after the drywall fell. The homeowners cleaned up the debris and rainwater the day after the storm. The homeowners never claimed that the shower, toilet, or sink was not functioning as usual. Thus, based on the court’s interpretation of the plain meaning of the “abrupt collapse” provision, there is no coverage under the policy.   

Escobar can be distinguished from a well-known collapse case, Kings Ridge Community Association, Inc. v. Sagamore Ins. Co., 98 So. 3d 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). Although the policy language regarding “abrupt collapse” in Kings Ridge was essentially identical to Escobar, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reached an opposite conclusion. 

In Kings Ridge, the court held that a covered collapse of a clubhouse roof was covered. Specifically, eleven roof trusses deflected twelve inches, causing the roof, drop ceiling, and soffits to move downward. Furthermore, even though the structure remained standing, it was rendered unsafe and unfit for occupancy by both parties’ expert engineers due to the structural damage. 

In conclusion, Florida courts apply the definition of collapse coverage based on the policy language, the specific circumstances of the case, and the structural elements involved in the collapse. 

For any further questions, please contact Keegan Lathan.